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Abstract: For those concerned with nature and role of the business firm in economy and society, 
these are challenging times. Past and ongoing financial crises and scandals have focused 
attention on the system of regulation, governance and disclosure in a way many may never have 
imagined and few welcomed. Those shortcomings relate to the primacy of shareholder value that 
frames and shapes the received system. Not only do reforms appear to be necessary to protect 
shareholders as well as other stakeholders, but also a different understanding of the relationship 
between the Share Exchange and the business firm.  This paper introduces the proceedings of the 
EAEPE international conference at the CNAM (Paris, on 22 and 23 May 2008). From different 
disciplines and perspectives, all the featured authors will critically discuss the received system 
and look for a more comprehensive approach integrating accounting, economics, and law of the 
business enterprise. 
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GOVERNING THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: OWNERSHIP, INSTITUTIONS, 
SOCIETY 
Yuri Biondi* 
 
Economies and societies are shaped by the working of business firms that raise overwhelming 
issues of disclosure, governance and regulation. In few decades, major trends and reforms -that 
appear to have led to systemic failure- have shifted the financial, economic, and legal 
frameworks in somewhat dramatic and unexpected ways. Behind the contingencies of recurrent 
financial crises, it is increasingly clear that lays the overall system of disclosure, governance and 
regulation of business firms and financial institutions, which constitute the financial, economic, 
and legal nexus that provides the institutional core of our socio-economy. 
 
Therefore, for those interested in disclosure, governance and regulation of business affairs, these 
are times of blood, sweat and tears. The scandals surrounding the failures and shortcomings 
associated with Long Term Capital Management (1998), Enron (2001), American Home 
Mortgage (2008), Lehman Brothers (2008), and many others, and the financial instability 
experienced by financial intermediaries worldwide, cast doubt on widespread governance 
practices and regulatory policies that have been fostered in recent decades. Concerns are 
increasingly expressed regarding fair value and mark-to-market accounting that were advocated 
by international accounting convergence (especially the International Accounting Standards 
Board - IASB, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board - FASB), but also on excessive 
and misleading incentives driven by the primacy of shareholders’ value in corporate governance 
and a lack of social responsibility, lack of stability in the market-based financial architecture, and 
unbalanced international economic relationships in the face of globalization. The emerging 
challenge is how to answer these issues without further distressing the entire socio-economic 
system. Environmental, societal, and civic needs are emerging at the core of the new agenda. 
Changes are required to protect stakeholders (including shareholders), and to assure the proper 
link between the financial and the economic system. The present system of business disclosure, 
governance and regulation is thus under strict scrutiny. 
 
Starting upon distinctive disciplines and perspectives, the papers collected in this special issue 
aim to better understand and renew this system. Especially three disciplines are concerned by 
this challenge: economics, accounting, and law. The three disciplines have developed distinctive 
perspectives and methodologies of research in order to deal with significant financial, economic, 
and legal issues that actually are common concerns. However, their respective approaches rarely 
interact or even know each one another. This has led to an unsatisfactory situation which results 
                                                
*Yuri Biondi studied economics and social sciences (DES) at the Bocconi University of Milan (M.Sc.), and 
economic analysis and history of institutions and organisations at the Lyon2 and Brescia Universities (PhD). In 
France, he has taught at the universities of Lyon2, St. Etienne, and the CNAM (www.cnam.fr). He is currently 
tenured researcher (research fellow) for the French Institute of Research (www.cnrs.fr) and affiliated professor of 
corporate governance and social responsibility at the CNAM. He is the promoter and main editor of The Firm as an 
Entity: Implications for Economics, Accounting, and Law (Routledge, 2007), and co-editor, with Tomo Suzuki, of 
The Socio Economics of Accounting (Socio Economic Review, special issue, October 2007).  
On 22 and 23 May 2008, he promoted and convened the Eaepe International Conference on “Governing the 
Business Enterprise: Ownership, Institutions, Society” at the Cnam, Paris (http://eaepe.cnam.fr). 
  
2                                                                      CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES                                               [VOL. 05 NO. 03  
in a limited, partial or even biased understanding of significant problems for economy and 
society. Each featured scholar has then accepted to share his specialised knowledge in order to 
contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the disclosure, governance and regulation of 
business affairs. In particular: 
 
• Clarke and Zumbansen address the current impasse as the crisis of the received system of 
disclosure, governance and regulation of the business firm driven by financialisation; 
• Moore and Reberioux, and Coriat and Weinstein disentangle the misplaced role of ownership 
as the proper foundation of that system; 
• Strasser and Blumberg, and Avi-Yonah further analyse the institutional substance of the firm 
as a business enterprise, and its implications for economy and society; 
• Sunder and Biondi point out the institutional nature and role of accounting in the creation and 
allocation of resources (production and distribution of revenues) generated by this business 
enterprise. 
 
Thomas Clarke and Peer Zumbansen engage the critique of the received system by addressing it 
as a peculiar “variety of capitalism” based on financialisation. Clarke examines how the Anglo-
American model of corporate governance affords executive managers of large corporations with 
inordinate power and wealth, and the consequences of this system for inequality in wider society. 
This arrogation of an increasing share of the wealth of corporations impacts upon relationships 
with other stakeholders and displaces entrepreneurial objectives. Furthermore, this finance-led 
variety of capitalism - that has been propagated vigorously throughout the world – is criticised to 
have massively incited to pursue vast securitization, delocalisation and leverage that eventually 
caused the collapse of financial institutions worldwide, unbalanced world economic trade, and 
impacted severely on the employment security and living standards of working people. This 
radical critique puts at issue the received mode of functioning and the related making-money 
scope of social responsibility of business and finance. Following Zumbansen, the contested 
concept of “corporate social responsibility” should be an integral part of corporate governance 
and regulation. He adopts an evolutionary analysis that distinguishes three historical phases and 
paradigms of the nature and role of the business firm: first, the economic/industrial organization 
paradigm; second, the financial paradigm; and third, the knowledge paradigm. Whilst the 
industrial phase pertains to the Fordist model of capitalism, and the financial phase corresponds 
to the Anglo-American model driven by financialisation, the last phase opens the way to the 
institutional nature of the business firm that was early recognised by Berle and Means. The 
business firm is assuming a host of socio-economic roles in a functionally differentiated global 
society. Beside and behind its role as economic and financial agency, the business firm – as 
concept and reality – assumes important features as a public institution concerned with economic 
and societal purposes and scope. 
 
The double critique addressed by these authors points out the active role that the complex and 
dynamic organisation of the business firm factually plays in our economy and society. Ideally 
drawing upon this critique, Moore and Reberioux, and Coriat and Weinstein disentangle the 
misplaced role of ownership as the proper foundation for disclosure, governance and regulation 
of this economic organisation. According to Moore and Reberioux, the conceptual boundaries of 
the corporate governance debate have been set narrowly in accordance with the logic of the 
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dominant ‘agency’ paradigm of governance. According to agency theory, the central ‘problem’ 
of corporate governance is the question of how to minimize the (harmful) consequences of the 
separation of ownership and control within public companies first identified by Berle and Means. 
The system of disclosure, governance and regulation of the business firm is then understood by 
coupling ownership and stock market pressures through competitive market-based incentive and 
disciplinary mechanisms. By analysing existing (US) corporate law doctrine in conjunction with 
recent developments in the economic theory of the firm, the authors present an alternative 
interpretation of the corporate governance ‘problem’ premised on the logic of institution rather 
than the market. Accordingly, the central governance ‘problem’ is that of how to exploit, rather 
than minimize, the (beneficial) consequences of the separation of ownership and control, so as to 
engender the development of a more dynamic and sustainable system of governance than that 
emanating from the free interplay of (share) market forces. This institutional perspective no 
longer understands the shareholders as the owners of the business firm, but recognises the firm as 
a legal-economic structure holding various liabilities and assets, including intangibles assets such 
as patents and copyrights. Coriat and Weinstein focus on the historical and institutional 
transformations of this intellectual property regime (IPR), more specifically patents regulatory 
framework, since the emergence of industrial capitalism, in the United States. Their analysis 
identifies three distinctive historical periods: a Victorian phase attaching intellectual property to 
individual inventors; the “fordist” phase of formation of corporate capitalism, dominated by 
large firms; and the recent period, beginning in the 1980s, characterized by the rising power of 
finance and financialisation. By adopting an institutional complementarities approach, they show 
how the characteristics and implications of IPR regimes may be understood only in relation to 
the transformations of the complementary institutional forms of capitalism: forms of business 
firms, conditions of labour relations (the “wage-labour nexus”) and characteristics of markets 
(product and financial markets). 
 
As a matter of theory and fact, this institutional perspective regarding the economy of business 
firms goes behind the legal frontiers of the corporate form to enter the intricacies of actual 
enterprise groups that factually constitute our economy. Although conducted world-wide through 
hundreds of corporate subsidiaries and affiliates, these groups typically are, in economic reality, 
a single economically integrated enterprise functioning with a common objective under the 
control of its parent company. Yet, Strasser and Blumberg claim, the prevailing legal models 
neglect, for the most part, this institutional connection. Mistakenly adopting outmoded concepts 
inherited from the misty past, these models focus on many separate subsidiary corporations that 
make up the business and necessarily overlook the larger whole. The result of this outdated view 
is a mismatch between business reality and legal form which has led so frequently to poor legal 
and regulatory decision-making and ineffectual public control. In order to overcome this 
uncomfortable situation, the authors sketch out a new legal theory of enterprise analysis. This 
enterprise analysis focuses on the implementation of the underlying policies and rules of the 
specific body of law at issue, such as securities, tax, or bankruptcy, to determine whether the 
objectives of that body of law are better served in the specific matter by looking to the whole 
enterprise or, alternatively, to the particular corporate subsidiary entities involved. In some areas 
this analysis purports to replace and in other areas to supplement existing legal models that are in 
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fact applying it in numerous areas, though to a limited extent. Such critique of received legal-
economic models and the adoption of a comprehensive enterprise perspective have one of the 
main areas of application in tax policy and regulation. Avi-Yonah addresses this legal-economic 
issue in connection with concerns of social responsibility and public welfare. Accordingly, 
taxation role and justification are related to the creation and allocation of resources generated by 
the business firm, and to the firm’s overall contribution to economy and society. The author 
shows that the received discourse on the business firm, argued for on the basis of shareholders’ 
primacy, is misguided and leads to paradoxical conclusions under usual constitutional principles 
of law and economics. The comprehensive perspective of the business firm as an enterprise 
entity is then advocated to better understand and guide tax policy and regulation in line with 
socio-economic performance and welfare of business.  
 
This enterprise analysis stresses the institutional core that influences the creation and allocation 
of resources generated by the business firm. The latter is then understood as an inter-individual 
dynamic environment that requires an accounting system to be managed, governed, and 
regulated in the interests of various stakeholders, including shareholders, for economic and social 
purposes. It is not a hazard, therefore, that the institutional approach to the business firm shares 
its historical roots with accounting (Biondi et al. 2007). The last two papers address this 
accounting connection by exploring the fundamental economic foundations and implications of 
accounting systems. Sunder’s analysis starts with the neoclassical model of the business firm. 
According to this model, the value surplus generated by the firm is assumed to accrue to its 
owner. In its effort to expand upon the neoclassical model, contract theory suggests a distribution 
of the surplus among various agents depending on the imperfections of the markets in which they 
transact with the firm. However, if the share of the surplus to an agent declines with the 
perfection of the market in which he transacts, shareholders should be expected to get only a 
small piece of the pie, perhaps the smallest one (because of (pretended) efficiency of stock 
market) violating the neoclassical assumption. To overcome this embarrassing theoretical and 
analytical result, the author explores an extensive value concept and its implications for the 
accounting representation of the business firm. In turn, Biondi’s analysis replaces this connection 
of accounting to the economic allocation of resources within the overall framework of 
governance and social responsibility of the business firm. The firm is then understood as a 
managed dynamic system, characterized by different structures of production: institutional, 
organizational or epistemic (related to the place of institutions, internal organization, and 
knowledge within the firm). Accordingly, the accounting system is an integral part of 
framework, which demonstrates the joint implications of economic, accounting, and legal 
matters within the firm. Market and ownership fail to (provide effective and complete incentives 
to) manage, govern, and regulate such business affair fraught with unfolding changes coupled 
with asymmetries of resources, access, control and information. The accounting system enters 
this uncomfortable inter-individual environment by representing the economic and monetary 
process generated by the whole enterprise entity. In this way, the accounting system allows the 
business firm to exist and function autonomously from, and interactively with, financial holding 
of shareholders’ claims traded on the Share Exchange. 
 
In one sentence, starting from distinctive disciplines and perspectives, the whole of these papers 
criticise the alleged primacy of shareholders’value in the governance and regulation of business 
2009]                                                   GOVERNING THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE                                                     5 
  
 
affairs, and contribute to an understanding of the business firm as an economic organisation and 
institution, that is, an enterprise entity. This comprehensive perspective has significant 
implications for the system of disclosure, governance, and regulation of the business firm, 
especially regarding its relationship with financial intermediation and shareholding. 
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